Geopolitical factors, including regional conflict, have exacerbated titanium and aluminium value chain constraints, raising concerns for aerospace manufacturing, says critical material supply chain advisory firm Project Blue founder and director Dr Nils Backeberg.

The aerospace manufacturing industry uses alloys and superalloys, exposing the industry to bulk materials, such as aluminium, nickel, cobalt, chromium and titanium, as well as niche materials, such as rhenium, hafnium and tantalum.

Backeberg points out that aerospace materials are specified by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) platforms, and new technology alloys and materials are enabling modern international travel. Owing of strict safety regulations, material suppliers must undertake a lengthy qualification process spanning several years, which limits the ability to substitute materials or introduce new supply chains.

Therefore, while the aerospace market requires relatively small volumes of minerals, it demands significantly higher-specification materials. These strict quality standards narrow the pool of qualified suppliers, making the supply chain more confined at each stage as materials are processed into higher-value forms.

“A key concern for the aerospace industry will be understanding its exposure to the various materials used in its alloys. These supply chains have typically been too far upstream for OEMs to get a full handle on them,” says Backeberg.

While every commodity faces unique supply chain risks, the stability of the titanium value chain has become a pressing concern for Western OEMs. Russia remains a key processor of aerospace-grade titanium; however, since the onset of the war in Ukraine, Western suppliers have significantly reduced their direct reliance on it.

“Historically, Russian processing giants relied on raw mineral feedstock acquired from Ukraine. Because the ongoing war severed that pipeline, a new trade loop has emerged: China now exports raw mineral feedstock to Russia, receiving premium, aerospace-grade titanium sponge in return.”

Backeberg elaborates that in pursuit of self-sufficiency, China is rapidly increasing its domestic production of aerospace-grade sponge, while also sustaining robust trade ties with Moscow. In response, Western OEMs have moved to certify Chinese sponge from leading producers, aiming to reinforce the stability of their downstream components.

Concurrently, state-owned aerospace manufacturer Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), is leveraging this domestic supply to fuel its own soaring aerospace ambitions.

Meanwhile, the global aluminium market is currently experiencing a supply deficit, with Project Blue forecasting that the 2026 aluminium market deficit will be around 900 000 t. This deficit could result in longer lead times for aluminium components within the aerospace supply chain.

Market tightness was exacerbated by the onset of the US/Israel-Iran conflict in February this year, which impacted on key producers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, according to Project Blue.

“The disruptions within the GCC have exacerbated an already-tightening supply outlook. At the start of 2026, Project Blue anticipated a market deficit of about 500 000 t,” the team says, adding that this reflects diversified mining and metals company South32’s December 2025 announcement that it would close its Mozal smelter in Mozambique in mid-March 2026.

Regional aluminium producers impacted include Emirates Global Aluminium’s (EGA’s) Al Taweelah and Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) smelters, as well as curtailments at Norsk Hydro and Qatar Aluminium Manufacturing’s Qatalum joint venture smelter. As a result, output in the region is expected to decline by about 20% to 25% this year, according to Project Blue’s estimates.

While it is unclear when shipment volumes through the Strait of Hormuz will be able to recover to pre-conflict levels, smelters in the Middle East are seemly recovering output faster than initially anticipated and appear to have resumed exports of metal where possible, says Backeberg. This has eased concerns over an extended regional supply shortfall.

However, given that smelter restarts are generally lengthy processes, recovery in Gulf production is likely to remain gradual into 2027, he notes.

EGA currently expects Al Taweelah to return to pre-conflict production levels in the first quarter of 2027. However, ALBA and Qatalum have not provided comparable recovery timelines, resulting in some uncertainty on the pace of the wider regional recovery.

Nonetheless, continued recovery in GCC production should contribute to a progressive narrowing of the deficit through 2027, says Backeberg.

Market disruption and the resulting higher aluminium prices have encouraged Western producers to look at shuttered assets and restart previously curtailed capacity in Europe and the US.

It is possible that US reactivations could lift primary aluminium output by about 20% in 2027 compared with 2025, supported by the Trump administration’s tariffs on primary aluminium, which rose from 25% to 50% in June 2025.

Meanwhile, in Canada, diversified mining company Rio Tinto has commissioned its $1.5-billion AP60 smelter expansion at the Complexe Arvida operation in Québec. The project will increase the company’s low-carbon primary aluminium capacity by about 160 000 t/y, with full operational completion expected by the end of 2026.

However, most of these developments will only help boost output materially from 2027 onward, says Backeberg.

In the interim, aerospace demand for aluminium is expected to remain robust in the near- to medium-term, owing to the shift to narrowbody aircraft production driving aluminium demand.